# Training Frontier Models to Out-Think Hackers — Uri Rolls, Arithmetic & Thom Wolf, Hugging Face

Source: [AI Engineer](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O-CBZ3JtRvo)  
Feed7 permalink: https://feed7.dev/p/training-frontier-models-to-out-think-hackers-uri-rolls-arithmetic-thom-0dvs2vw  
Published: 2026-07-24T05:19:15.000Z  
Trust: Source Linked (source_linked)

## Why Included

This security eval tests whether agents can discover and exploit logic flaws across live chained services, using hidden zero-days and deterministic grading instead of source-code pattern matching.

## Source Summary

The benchmark builds live, chained application environments around **real zero-days** found by human researchers. Agents start with limited access, receive **no internet or source code**, and must infer the system’s state while pursuing an exploit.

## Practical Implication

For security-agent evals, test black-box reasoning across authentication, permissions, and service boundaries. Record partial progress with **deterministic graders** so model or harness changes can be compared even when full exploitation is rare.

## Agent-Ready Context

The benchmark builds live, chained application environments around **real zero-days** found by human researchers. Agents start with limited access, receive **no internet or source code**, and must infer the system’s state while pursuing an exploit.

For security-agent evals, test black-box reasoning across authentication, permissions, and service boundaries. Record partial progress with **deterministic graders** so model or harness changes can be compared even when full exploitation is rare.

The presented benchmark remained extremely difficult, with **one solve at k=1**. Its access-control scenarios demonstrate a demanding evaluation method, but not yet the broader claim that specialized open models can replace existing defensive systems.

## Context Map

- Layer: benchmark
- Domains: security
- Topics: agent-evals, reasoning, open-models

## Uncertainty

- The presented benchmark remained extremely difficult, with **one solve at k=1**. Its access-control scenarios demonstrate a demanding evaluation method, but not yet the broader claim that specialized open models can replace existing defensive systems.

## Agent Instruction

Use this item as source-backed context. Do not invent claims beyond the linked source. If this item conflicts with another source, call out the conflict.
